Die deutsche Botschaft in Washington hat BMF einen Bericht zu sog "SILO-Geschäften (sale in - lease out) zugeleitet, über den ich hiermit informiere. Die Botschaft hat auf das Folgende hingewiesen:
1. SILO-Geschäfte mit steuerneutralen Vertragspartnern sind umstritten
Mit Notice 2005-13 hat die US-Bundessteuerverwaltung (IRS) auf vertragliche Leasingkonstruktionen mit steuerindifferenten Vertragspartnern Bezug genommen, bei denen langlebige Wirtschaftsgüter (z.B. kommunale Immobilien oder Betriebseinrichtungen) an US-Investoren verkauft und gleichzeitig zurückgeleast (sale in/lease out, kurz SILO) werden.
An derartigen Geschäften sind in nennenswertem Umfang auch deutsche Kommunen beteiligt. Seinen wirtschaftlichen Reiz bezog das Steuermodell durch den Umstand, daß der US-Investor - anders als die deutsche Kommune - das Abschreibungspotential des Wirtschaftsgutes nutzen konnte. Die Geschäfte gingen damit ausschließlich zu Lasten des US-Fiskus.
Der US-Gesetzgeber hat diesen Steuermodellen bereits im Herbst vergangenen Jahres die Attraktivität genommen, indem er die Abziehbarkeit von Abschreibungen auf die in dem betreffenden Steuerjahr erzielten Leasingeinnahmen aus dem SILO-Geschäft beschränkte. Die Rechtsänderung gilt für Verträge, die nach dem 11. März 2004 geschlossen wurden.
2. Anzeigepflicht wird klargestellt
In Notice 2005-13 stellt der IRS nunmehr allgemein fest, daß bei Vorliegen bestimmter vertraglicher Vereinbarungen, die typischerweise bei SILO-Verträgen gewählt werden, ein steuerlicher Gestaltungsmißbrauch vorliege ("tax avoidance transaction"), der nach dem Grundsatz substance over form dazu führen kann, daß dem US-Investor das von ihm erworbene Wirtschaftsgut steuerlich nicht als Eigentum zugerechnet wird und bei diesem dann nicht steuermindernd abgeschrieben werden kann.
Der Erlaß stellt klar, daß es sich bei den abstrakt beschriebenen Gestaltungen, die in dem Erlaß durch zwei Beispiele konkretisiert werden, um so genannte "listed transactions" handele, die sowohl vom Steuerpflichtigen als auch von beteiligten Beratern der US-Steuerverwaltung angezeigt werden müssen. Bei Nichtanzeige drohen erhebliche Geldstrafen.
3. Nichtanerkennung nach substance over form doctrine
Bei den zwei im Erlaß erläuterten Beispielsfällen handelt es sich um Gestaltungen, bei denen US-Investoren und steuerindifferente Vertragspartner ein kombiniertes Kauf- und Rückmietgeschäft eingehen und sich Kaufpreis und akkumulierte Mietzahlungen unter Berücksichtigung der Finanzierungskosten gegenseitig aufheben. Weiterhin sind sowohl das Verlustrisiko als auch das Wertminderungsrisiko auf Seiten des US-Investors begrenzt, ebenso wie der US-Investor in Bezug auf das Leasinggut nicht von potentiellen Wertsteigerungen profitiert. In der sich an die Darstellung der Beispiele anschließenden rechtlichen Analyse zieht die Verwaltung Vergleichsfälle heran, in denen US-Gerichte nach dem Grundsatz substance over form die gewählte Vertragsgestaltung steuerlich nicht anerkannt haben.
4. Bedeutung für deutsche Kommunen aus Sicht der Botschaft nicht einschätzbar
Ob und inwieweit sich durch die jetzige Klarstellung des IRS Auswirkungen für deutsche Kommunen ergeben, die an entsprechenden Modellen beteiligt sind, ist eine Frage der tatsächlichen Vertragsgestaltung und aus Sicht der Botschaft nicht einschätzbar.
(AZ: V A 3 - FV 5010 - 104/05 vom 25. April 2005)
Eine Dokumentation der DUE FINANCE Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH Steuerberatungsgesellschaft über Nachrichten, Veröffentlichungen und Entwicklungen in den Jahren 1998 bis 2006.
Montag, April 25, 2005
Montag, März 21, 2005
Rechtsgrundlagen eines Risikomanagementsystems
§ 10 Abs. 1 EigBetrVO NW i.d.F.d. NKF: „Für die dauernde technische und wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit des Eigenbetriebs ist zu sorgen. Hierzu ist u.a. ein Überwachungssystem einzurichten, das es ermöglicht, etwaige bestandsgefährdende Entwicklungen frühzeitig zu erkennen. Zur Risikofrüherkennung gehören insbesondere die Risikoidentifikation, die Risikobewertung, Maßnahmen der Risikobewältigung einschließlich der Risikokommunikation, die Risikoüberwachung/ Risikofortschreibung und die Dokumentation.“
§ 91 Abs. 2 AktG (KonTraG): „Der Vorstand hat geeignete Maßnahmen zu treffen, insbesondere ein Überwachungssystem einzurichten, damit den Fortbestand der Gesellschaft gefährdende Entwicklungen früh erkannt werden.“
§ 53 HGrG (IDW PS 720), § 317 Abs. 4 HGB: „… ist außerdem im Rahmen der Prüfung zu beurteilen, ob der Vorstand die ihm nach § 91 Abs. 2 des Aktiengesetzes obliegenden Maßnahmen in einer geeigneten Form getroffen hat und ob das danach einzurichtende Überwachungssystem seine Aufgaben erfüllen kann.“
§ 91 Abs. 2 AktG (KonTraG): „Der Vorstand hat geeignete Maßnahmen zu treffen, insbesondere ein Überwachungssystem einzurichten, damit den Fortbestand der Gesellschaft gefährdende Entwicklungen früh erkannt werden.“
§ 53 HGrG (IDW PS 720), § 317 Abs. 4 HGB: „… ist außerdem im Rahmen der Prüfung zu beurteilen, ob der Vorstand die ihm nach § 91 Abs. 2 des Aktiengesetzes obliegenden Maßnahmen in einer geeigneten Form getroffen hat und ob das danach einzurichtende Überwachungssystem seine Aufgaben erfüllen kann.“
Donnerstag, März 03, 2005
US Treasury seeks to claw back tax breaks in ‘Silo’ leasing deals
Treasury and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) surprised the US leasing industry with the publication of guidance on February 11 designating so-called SILO deals as “listed transactions”. This adds the lease-to-service contract structure to a growing list of tax-driven products where the IRS intends to challenge claims for tax breaks, and requires investors and promoters of the schemes to disclose their participation to the tax authority.
The revenue notice comes as somewhat a surprise, given that ‘sale-in/lease-out’ transactions were made illegal under tax law changes in the American Jobs Creation Act, signed in October 2004. The legislation provided transitional relief for leases signed before March 12, 2004, effectively grandfathering the structure, and leasing industry representatives have seized on this as an indication that previous transactions were valid under legislation at the time. Says one source: “The Treasury and the IRS have taken the view that these transactions were an abuse of the tax code, but if they were already illegal why did Congress need to change the law?”
In a striking inconsistency, deals involving qualified transportation property remain exempt from the Treasury’s action. This allows selected leasing transactions planned by public transit authorities before the 2004 legislation to close under the now obsolete tax regime – as provided for under the Jobs Act. Tax lawyers will question why the Treasury has accepted this grandfathering provision, but rejected another that applied the new tax treatment only to deals closed after March 12 2004.
The chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Charles Grassley, has praised the Treasury action. Grassley, who failed in his campaign last year to apply the new legislation retroactively, said in a February 11 release: “Today’s action complements our new law going after these deals. It reaches back to the deals that otherwise might have gotten away. This Treasury Department has been very active in attacking tax shelters, and I appreciate the support it’s given to the Finance Committee in our anti-shelter efforts.”
The IRS guidance targets leasing to tax-exempt entities where “substantially all of the tax-indifferent person’s payment obligations are economically defeased and the taxpayer’s risk of loss from a decline, and opportunity for profit from an increase, in the value of the leased property are limited.” While some lease-to-service contract transactions were not defeased and will therefore escape scrutiny, most domestic and cross-border deals completed on the structure will be affected. Leases of qualified technological equipment (QTE) are not exempted from the new reporting requirements.
The notice advises taxpayers that tax advantages previously assumed may not be available, saying: “The Service and the Treasury Department recognize that some taxpayers may have filed tax returns taking the position that they were entitled to the purported tax benefits of the types of transactions described in this notice. These taxpayers should consult with a tax advisor to ensure that their transactions are disclosed properly and to take appropriate corrective action.”
The revenue notice comes as somewhat a surprise, given that ‘sale-in/lease-out’ transactions were made illegal under tax law changes in the American Jobs Creation Act, signed in October 2004. The legislation provided transitional relief for leases signed before March 12, 2004, effectively grandfathering the structure, and leasing industry representatives have seized on this as an indication that previous transactions were valid under legislation at the time. Says one source: “The Treasury and the IRS have taken the view that these transactions were an abuse of the tax code, but if they were already illegal why did Congress need to change the law?”
In a striking inconsistency, deals involving qualified transportation property remain exempt from the Treasury’s action. This allows selected leasing transactions planned by public transit authorities before the 2004 legislation to close under the now obsolete tax regime – as provided for under the Jobs Act. Tax lawyers will question why the Treasury has accepted this grandfathering provision, but rejected another that applied the new tax treatment only to deals closed after March 12 2004.
The chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Charles Grassley, has praised the Treasury action. Grassley, who failed in his campaign last year to apply the new legislation retroactively, said in a February 11 release: “Today’s action complements our new law going after these deals. It reaches back to the deals that otherwise might have gotten away. This Treasury Department has been very active in attacking tax shelters, and I appreciate the support it’s given to the Finance Committee in our anti-shelter efforts.”
The IRS guidance targets leasing to tax-exempt entities where “substantially all of the tax-indifferent person’s payment obligations are economically defeased and the taxpayer’s risk of loss from a decline, and opportunity for profit from an increase, in the value of the leased property are limited.” While some lease-to-service contract transactions were not defeased and will therefore escape scrutiny, most domestic and cross-border deals completed on the structure will be affected. Leases of qualified technological equipment (QTE) are not exempted from the new reporting requirements.
The notice advises taxpayers that tax advantages previously assumed may not be available, saying: “The Service and the Treasury Department recognize that some taxpayers may have filed tax returns taking the position that they were entitled to the purported tax benefits of the types of transactions described in this notice. These taxpayers should consult with a tax advisor to ensure that their transactions are disclosed properly and to take appropriate corrective action.”
Dienstag, März 01, 2005
Risiken des U.S. Cross-Border-Leasings
Cross-Border-Leasing Verträge müssen so verhandelt und abgeschlossen werden, als ob die Investoren- und Bankenseite jeden Schwachpunkt und jede Unklarheit zu Lasten der kommunalen Seite ausnutzen würde. Es entspricht der traditionellen U.S. amerikanischen Anwalts- und Unternehmenskultur, daß Fehler gnadenlos ausgenutzt werden. Die nachlässige Verhandlungsführung in der Erwartung, daß auf Rechtspositionen später verzichtet und vorteilhafte Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten nicht ausgeübt werden könnten, ist naiv und sträflich. Hierbei ist zu berücksichtigen, daß der Investor seine vertragliche Position jederzeit mit allen Rechten und Pflichten auf robuste Dritte ("Bad Lease Investor") übertragen kann.
Die Risiken aus einer abgeschlossenen Cross-Border-Leasing Transaktion lassen sich generell einteilen in die drei Risikoklassen
* nachträgliche Zahlungspflichten,
* Vertragsbruch und
* Steuerentschädigungspflichten.
Im ersten Fall geht es um außerplanmäßige Zahlungen, für die nicht bereits Sorge getragen wurde. Im zweiten Fall geht es um einen Verstoß gegen Zahlungs- oder Handlungspflichten und im dritten Fall um einen Verlust des erstrebten Steuervorteils.
Die U.S. steuerliche Anerkennung setzt voraus, daß die Verträge ernsthaft gewollt sind und so wie vereinbart auch tatsächlich durchgeführt werden. Soweit die Investorenseite ihre Rechte nicht zeitnah durchsetzt oder auf Ansprüche großzügig verzichtet, begründet sie die Gefahr, daß dies steuerlich als Indiz für das Vorliegen eines reines Steuersparmodells oder eines Scheinvertrags gewertet werden kann. Die Übernahme dieses Risikos durch die Leasingnehmerseite - etwa im Rahmen eines Verzichts auf die Geltendmachung von Investorenrechten ("Waiver") - begründet eine schwere Last.
Pflicht zur Erbringung zusätzlicher Zahlungen während der Vertragslaufzeit
Es handelt sich beim Cross-Border-Leasing Geschäft um ein sogenanntes Nettonettonettoleasing. Die Kosten für Versicherung, Steuern und Instandhaltung verbleiben beim Eigentümer und Betreiber. Im Rahmen der Vertragsdokumente verpflichtet sich der Leasingnehmer zusätzlich dazu, bestimmte Kosten während der Vertragslaufzeit zu erstatten.
Die Transaktionsstruktur ist regelmäßig darauf gerichtet, die regulären Zahlungen im Rahmen von Zahlungsübernahmevereinbarungen wirtschaftlich voraus zu leisten. Bei ordnungsgemäßem Ablauf der Transaktion und wenn die Beendigungsoption später positiv ausgeübt wird, müssen somit keine neuen Mittel ("fresh money") aufgewendet werden.
Nachzahlungen sind somit (nur) zu leisten, wenn
* die Vorauszahlungen nicht in dem Umfang erfolgt sind, daß sie für die späteren Zahlungen tatsächlich ausreichen,
* die eingeschalteten Finanzinstitute ihren Zahlungspflichten (z.B. wegen Insolvenz) nicht nachkommen oder
* nachträgliche Kosten aufgrund eines Mehraufwands, einer Kostensteigerung oder einer Entschädigungsverpflichtung entstehen. Dies umfaßt auch eine unvorhergesehene steuerliche Belastung.
Das Verlustrisiko aus den Zahlungsübernahmevereinbarungen beträgt je nach der konkreten Funktion des ausgefallenen Bankinstituts typischerweise nominal maximal 8% oder 77% oder 200 bis 300% des Transaktionsvolumens. Das Risiko wird zusätzlich z.B. akut im Falle einer nachteiligen Rechts- oder Steuerrechtsänderung. Hierunter fallen aber auch Gestaltungen, bei denen bei Vertragsabschluß irrtümlicherweise bestehende oder absehbare Belastungen nicht berücksichtigt wurden.
Vertragsbruchrisiken
Im Fall eines Vertragsbruchs kann die U.S. Seite die Verträge kündigen und als pauschalierten Schadensersatz einen vorab festgelegten Beendigungswert ("Termination Value") verlangen, üblicherweise in der Spitze beim Zehnfachen des Nettobarwertvorteils.
Vertragsbruchfälle umfassen insbesondere
* Verstöße gegen bestimmte Zusicherungen ("Representations")
* Verstöße gegen bestimmte Verhaltenspflichten ("Covenants") und
* Verstöße gegen bestimmte Zahlungspflichten ("Payment Default").
Falls der Beendigungswert tatsächlich gezahlt wird, erhält der Investor unmittelbar von seinem Vertragspartner auch den Vorteil, den er ansonsten aufgrund der U.S. Steuereffekte mittelbar von der U.S. Finanzverwaltung erhalten hätte. Der Zahlungsanspruch ist nicht davon abhängig, daß der Investor nachweisen kann, daß er bei einem Fortbestand der Verträge überhaupt Steuervorteile erzielt hätte. Die Höhe des pauschalierten Schadensersatzes ("Termination Value") ist von der zukünftigen Zinsentwicklung abhängig. Detaillierte Angaben zur Betragshöhe finden sich üblicherweise in den Aufsichtsrats- und Stadtratsvorlagen, die Gegenstand der Beschlußfassung der kommunalen Seite sind, so daß es sich hierbei nicht um überraschende Neuigkeiten handelt.
Die vorzeitige Beendigung des Leasingvertrages aufgrund eines Vertragsbruchs setzt voraus, daß ein Vertragsbruch vorliegt ("Default") und die U.S. Seite dies ausdrücklich erklärt ("Event of Default"). Ob der Investor einen Verstoß gegen vertragliche Pflichten tatsächlich ausnutzen wird, um einen Schadensersatzanspruch tatsächlich geltend zu machen und anschließend durchzusetzen, wurde in der Vergangenheit unterschiedlich beurteilt. Aus heutiger Sicht, vor dem Hintergrund notleidender Leasingstrukturen, wird sich der ordnungsgemäß handelnde Kaufmann darauf einzustellen haben, daß es sich die U.S. Seite keinesfalls leisten kann, auf die Geltendmachung bestehender Ansprüche in achtstelliger Höhe zu verzichten (Just-in-case-Szenario).
Verteilung des U.S. Steueranerkennungsrisikos
Der U.S. steuerliche Vorteil des U.S. Investors setzt insbesondere voraus, daß Leasinggegenstände, die untrennbar mit der kommunalen Infrastruktur in Deutschland verbunden sind, von der U.S. Seite wie eigenes Vermögen U.S. steuerlich abgeschrieben werden können. "Grundsätzlich" trägt der Investor das Risiko, ob diese mutige Konzeption zu den erwarteten Steuereffekten führt. Dies gilt auch dann, wenn sich die negativen Auswirkungen erst aufgrund einer späteren Rechtsänderung ergeben.
Sämtliche abgeschlossenen Verträge enthalten jedoch umfangreiche Regelungen, in welchen Fällen der Leasingnehmer direkt oder indirekt für tatsächliche oder fiktive U.S. Steuervorteile des Investors einzustehen hat. Die Ersatzpflicht der deutschen Seite besteht nicht nur für rechtliche oder tatsächliche Zusicherungen, die sich als unzutreffend heraus stellen, sondern auch für sämtliche nach deutschem Recht während der Vertragslaufzeit erforderlichen oder freiwilligen Handlungen und Erklärungen, soweit diese in den damaligen Vertragsdokumenten nicht ausdrücklich als erlaubt aufgelistet wurden. Auch das Risiko, daß Austausch- und Ersetzungsvorgänge auf deutscher Seite aufgrund einer zwischenzeitlichen U.S. Steuerrechtsänderung zu einem U.S. Steuernachteil führen, trägt die deutsche kommunale Seite.
Eine derartige Regelung wird insbesondere dann praktisch relevant, wenn dem Investor im Rahmen seiner steuerlichen Betriebsprüfung die Anerkennung des Konstrukts ganz oder teilweise versagt wird. Typische Ansatzpunkte hierfür ist das durchaus verständliche Vorbringen der Finanzverwaltung, daß
* die Investorenseite durch die Regelungen des Hauptmietvertrages einschließlich der hierfür bestellten Sicherheiten bei einer steuerlichen Gesamtwürdigung kein echtes bilanzielles Eigentum erlangt hat,
* die wirtschaftliche Vorauszahlung durch den Leasingnehmer auch aus U.S. Sicht zur Umqualifizierung des Geschäfts in eine reine Finanzierung (Karussellgeschäft) führt,
* die Optionsausübung aufgrund der zwingenden öffentlich-rechtlichen Regelungen in Deutschland und den wirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen auch bei Vertragsschluß nicht wirklich offen war, oder
* der Leasingnehmer mit den Leasinggegenständen nicht wie ein Mieter, sondern wie ein U.S. steuerlicher Eigentümer umgeht.
In derartigen Fällen besteht für die Investorenseite der unmittelbare wirtschaftliche Anreiz, die Schuld für das steuerliche Verunglücken der Gestaltung auf den Vertragspartner zu schieben, um sich von ihm den Profit zu holen, den er aus U.S. Steuervorteilen nicht erzielen kann. Die Leasingverträge sehen für eine derartige Ersatzpflicht keine Obergrenze vor.
Die Risiken aus einer abgeschlossenen Cross-Border-Leasing Transaktion lassen sich generell einteilen in die drei Risikoklassen
* nachträgliche Zahlungspflichten,
* Vertragsbruch und
* Steuerentschädigungspflichten.
Im ersten Fall geht es um außerplanmäßige Zahlungen, für die nicht bereits Sorge getragen wurde. Im zweiten Fall geht es um einen Verstoß gegen Zahlungs- oder Handlungspflichten und im dritten Fall um einen Verlust des erstrebten Steuervorteils.
Die U.S. steuerliche Anerkennung setzt voraus, daß die Verträge ernsthaft gewollt sind und so wie vereinbart auch tatsächlich durchgeführt werden. Soweit die Investorenseite ihre Rechte nicht zeitnah durchsetzt oder auf Ansprüche großzügig verzichtet, begründet sie die Gefahr, daß dies steuerlich als Indiz für das Vorliegen eines reines Steuersparmodells oder eines Scheinvertrags gewertet werden kann. Die Übernahme dieses Risikos durch die Leasingnehmerseite - etwa im Rahmen eines Verzichts auf die Geltendmachung von Investorenrechten ("Waiver") - begründet eine schwere Last.
Pflicht zur Erbringung zusätzlicher Zahlungen während der Vertragslaufzeit
Es handelt sich beim Cross-Border-Leasing Geschäft um ein sogenanntes Nettonettonettoleasing. Die Kosten für Versicherung, Steuern und Instandhaltung verbleiben beim Eigentümer und Betreiber. Im Rahmen der Vertragsdokumente verpflichtet sich der Leasingnehmer zusätzlich dazu, bestimmte Kosten während der Vertragslaufzeit zu erstatten.
Die Transaktionsstruktur ist regelmäßig darauf gerichtet, die regulären Zahlungen im Rahmen von Zahlungsübernahmevereinbarungen wirtschaftlich voraus zu leisten. Bei ordnungsgemäßem Ablauf der Transaktion und wenn die Beendigungsoption später positiv ausgeübt wird, müssen somit keine neuen Mittel ("fresh money") aufgewendet werden.
Nachzahlungen sind somit (nur) zu leisten, wenn
* die Vorauszahlungen nicht in dem Umfang erfolgt sind, daß sie für die späteren Zahlungen tatsächlich ausreichen,
* die eingeschalteten Finanzinstitute ihren Zahlungspflichten (z.B. wegen Insolvenz) nicht nachkommen oder
* nachträgliche Kosten aufgrund eines Mehraufwands, einer Kostensteigerung oder einer Entschädigungsverpflichtung entstehen. Dies umfaßt auch eine unvorhergesehene steuerliche Belastung.
Das Verlustrisiko aus den Zahlungsübernahmevereinbarungen beträgt je nach der konkreten Funktion des ausgefallenen Bankinstituts typischerweise nominal maximal 8% oder 77% oder 200 bis 300% des Transaktionsvolumens. Das Risiko wird zusätzlich z.B. akut im Falle einer nachteiligen Rechts- oder Steuerrechtsänderung. Hierunter fallen aber auch Gestaltungen, bei denen bei Vertragsabschluß irrtümlicherweise bestehende oder absehbare Belastungen nicht berücksichtigt wurden.
Vertragsbruchrisiken
Im Fall eines Vertragsbruchs kann die U.S. Seite die Verträge kündigen und als pauschalierten Schadensersatz einen vorab festgelegten Beendigungswert ("Termination Value") verlangen, üblicherweise in der Spitze beim Zehnfachen des Nettobarwertvorteils.
Vertragsbruchfälle umfassen insbesondere
* Verstöße gegen bestimmte Zusicherungen ("Representations")
* Verstöße gegen bestimmte Verhaltenspflichten ("Covenants") und
* Verstöße gegen bestimmte Zahlungspflichten ("Payment Default").
Falls der Beendigungswert tatsächlich gezahlt wird, erhält der Investor unmittelbar von seinem Vertragspartner auch den Vorteil, den er ansonsten aufgrund der U.S. Steuereffekte mittelbar von der U.S. Finanzverwaltung erhalten hätte. Der Zahlungsanspruch ist nicht davon abhängig, daß der Investor nachweisen kann, daß er bei einem Fortbestand der Verträge überhaupt Steuervorteile erzielt hätte. Die Höhe des pauschalierten Schadensersatzes ("Termination Value") ist von der zukünftigen Zinsentwicklung abhängig. Detaillierte Angaben zur Betragshöhe finden sich üblicherweise in den Aufsichtsrats- und Stadtratsvorlagen, die Gegenstand der Beschlußfassung der kommunalen Seite sind, so daß es sich hierbei nicht um überraschende Neuigkeiten handelt.
Die vorzeitige Beendigung des Leasingvertrages aufgrund eines Vertragsbruchs setzt voraus, daß ein Vertragsbruch vorliegt ("Default") und die U.S. Seite dies ausdrücklich erklärt ("Event of Default"). Ob der Investor einen Verstoß gegen vertragliche Pflichten tatsächlich ausnutzen wird, um einen Schadensersatzanspruch tatsächlich geltend zu machen und anschließend durchzusetzen, wurde in der Vergangenheit unterschiedlich beurteilt. Aus heutiger Sicht, vor dem Hintergrund notleidender Leasingstrukturen, wird sich der ordnungsgemäß handelnde Kaufmann darauf einzustellen haben, daß es sich die U.S. Seite keinesfalls leisten kann, auf die Geltendmachung bestehender Ansprüche in achtstelliger Höhe zu verzichten (Just-in-case-Szenario).
Verteilung des U.S. Steueranerkennungsrisikos
Der U.S. steuerliche Vorteil des U.S. Investors setzt insbesondere voraus, daß Leasinggegenstände, die untrennbar mit der kommunalen Infrastruktur in Deutschland verbunden sind, von der U.S. Seite wie eigenes Vermögen U.S. steuerlich abgeschrieben werden können. "Grundsätzlich" trägt der Investor das Risiko, ob diese mutige Konzeption zu den erwarteten Steuereffekten führt. Dies gilt auch dann, wenn sich die negativen Auswirkungen erst aufgrund einer späteren Rechtsänderung ergeben.
Sämtliche abgeschlossenen Verträge enthalten jedoch umfangreiche Regelungen, in welchen Fällen der Leasingnehmer direkt oder indirekt für tatsächliche oder fiktive U.S. Steuervorteile des Investors einzustehen hat. Die Ersatzpflicht der deutschen Seite besteht nicht nur für rechtliche oder tatsächliche Zusicherungen, die sich als unzutreffend heraus stellen, sondern auch für sämtliche nach deutschem Recht während der Vertragslaufzeit erforderlichen oder freiwilligen Handlungen und Erklärungen, soweit diese in den damaligen Vertragsdokumenten nicht ausdrücklich als erlaubt aufgelistet wurden. Auch das Risiko, daß Austausch- und Ersetzungsvorgänge auf deutscher Seite aufgrund einer zwischenzeitlichen U.S. Steuerrechtsänderung zu einem U.S. Steuernachteil führen, trägt die deutsche kommunale Seite.
Eine derartige Regelung wird insbesondere dann praktisch relevant, wenn dem Investor im Rahmen seiner steuerlichen Betriebsprüfung die Anerkennung des Konstrukts ganz oder teilweise versagt wird. Typische Ansatzpunkte hierfür ist das durchaus verständliche Vorbringen der Finanzverwaltung, daß
* die Investorenseite durch die Regelungen des Hauptmietvertrages einschließlich der hierfür bestellten Sicherheiten bei einer steuerlichen Gesamtwürdigung kein echtes bilanzielles Eigentum erlangt hat,
* die wirtschaftliche Vorauszahlung durch den Leasingnehmer auch aus U.S. Sicht zur Umqualifizierung des Geschäfts in eine reine Finanzierung (Karussellgeschäft) führt,
* die Optionsausübung aufgrund der zwingenden öffentlich-rechtlichen Regelungen in Deutschland und den wirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen auch bei Vertragsschluß nicht wirklich offen war, oder
* der Leasingnehmer mit den Leasinggegenständen nicht wie ein Mieter, sondern wie ein U.S. steuerlicher Eigentümer umgeht.
In derartigen Fällen besteht für die Investorenseite der unmittelbare wirtschaftliche Anreiz, die Schuld für das steuerliche Verunglücken der Gestaltung auf den Vertragspartner zu schieben, um sich von ihm den Profit zu holen, den er aus U.S. Steuervorteilen nicht erzielen kann. Die Leasingverträge sehen für eine derartige Ersatzpflicht keine Obergrenze vor.
Montag, Februar 28, 2005
IRS: Notice 2005-13
Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2005-9
February 28, 2005
Notice 2005-13
Tax-Exempt Leasing Involving Defeasance
The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department are aware of types of transactions, described below, in which a taxpayer enters into a purported sale-leaseback arrangement with a tax-indifferent person in which substantially all of the tax-indifferent person’s payment obligations are economically defeased and the taxpayer’s risk of loss from a decline, and opportunity for profit from an increase, in the value of the leased property are limited. This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that these transactions are tax avoidance transactions and identifies these transactions, and substantially similar transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) of the Income Tax Regulations and §§ 6111 and 6112 of the Internal Revenue Code. This notice also alerts parties involved with these transactions of certain responsibilities that may arise from their involvement with these transactions.
FACTS
X is a U.S. taxpayer. FP is a tax-indifferent person that owns and uses certain property.[1] BK1, BK2, BK3, and BK4 are banks. None of these parties is related to any other party, unless otherwise indicated.
Situation 1
On the closing date of January 1, 2003 (“Closing Date”), X and FP enter into a purported sale-leaseback transaction under which FP sells the property to X, and X immediately leases the property back to FP under a lease (“Lease”). The purchase and sale agreement and the Lease are nominally separate legal documents. Both agreements, however, are executed pursuant to a comprehensive participation agreement, which provides that the parties’ rights and obligations under any of the agreements are not enforceable before the execution of all transaction documents.
The Lease requires FP to make rental payments over the term of the Lease (“Lease Term”). As described below, the Lease also provides that under certain conditions, X has the option (“Service Contract Option”) to require FP to identify a party (“Service Recipient”) willing to enter into a contract with X to receive services provided using the leased property (“Service Contract”) that commences immediately after the expiration of the Lease Term. The Service Recipient must meet certain financial qualifications, including credit rating and net capital requirements, and provide defeasance or other credit support to satisfy certain of its obligations under the Service Contract. If FP cannot locate a qualified third party to enter into the Service Contract, FP or an affiliate of FP must enter into the Service Contract. The aggregate of the Lease Term plus the term of the Service Contract (“Service Contract Term”) is less than 80 percent of the assumed remaining useful life of the property.
On the Closing Date, the property has a fair market value of $105x and X makes a single payment of $105x to FP. To fund the $105x payment, X provides $15x in equity and borrows $81x from BK1 and $9x from BK2. Both loans are nonrecourse and provide for payments during the Lease Term. Accrued but unpaid interest is capitalized as additional principal. As of the Closing Date, the documents reflect that the sum of the outstanding principal on the loans at any given time will be less than the projected fair market value of the property at that time. The amount and timing of the debt service payments closely match the amount and timing of the Lease payments due during the Lease Term.
FP intends to utilize only a small portion of the proceeds of the purported sale-leaseback for operational expenses or to finance or refinance the acquisition of new assets. Upon receiving the $105x purchase price payment, FP sets aside substantially all of the $105x to satisfy its lease obligations. FP deposits $81x with BK3 and $9x with BK4. BK3 may be an affiliate of BK1, and BK4 may be an affiliate of BK2. The deposits with BK3 and BK4 earn interest sufficient to fund FP’s rent obligations as described below. BK3 pays annual amounts equal to 90 percent of FP’s annual rent obligation under the Lease (that is, amounts sufficient to satisfy X’s debt service obligation to BK1). Although FP directs BK3 to pay those amounts to BK1, the parties treat these amounts as having been paid from BK3 to FP, then from FP to X as rental payments, and finally from X to BK1 as debt service payments. In addition, FP pledges the deposit with BK3 to X as security for FP’s obligations under the Lease, while X, in turn, pledges its interest in FP’s pledge to BK1 as security for X’s obligations under the loan from BK1. Similarly, BK4 pays annual amounts equal to 10 percent of FP’s rent obligation under the Lease (that is, amounts sufficient to satisfy X’s debt service obligation to BK2). Although FP directs BK4 to pay these amounts to BK2, the parties treat these amounts as having been paid from BK4 to FP, then from FP to X as rental payments, and finally from X to BK2 as debt service payments. Although FP’s deposit with BK4 is not pledged, the parties expect that the amounts deposited with BK4 will remain available to pay the remaining 10 percent of FP’s annual rent obligation under the Lease. FP may incur economic costs, such as an early withdrawal penalty, in accessing the BK4 deposit.
FP is not legally released from its rent obligations. X’s exposure to the risk that FP will not make the rent payments, however, is substantially limited by the arrangements with BK3 and BK4. In the case of the loan from BK1, X’s economic risk is remote due to the deposit arrangement with BK3. In the case of the loan from BK2, X’s economic risk is substantially reduced through the deposit arrangement with BK4. X’s obligation to make debt service payments on the loans from BK1 and BK2 is completely offset by X’s right to receive Lease rentals from FP. As a result, neither bank bears a significant risk of nonpayment.[2]
FP has an option (“Purchase Option”) to purchase the property from X on the last day of the Lease Term (“Exercise Date”). Exercise of the Purchase Option allows FP to repurchase the property for a fixed exercise price (“Exercise Price”) that, on the Closing Date, exceeds the projected fair market value of the property on the Exercise Date. The Purchase Option price is sufficient to repay X’s entire loan balances and X’s initial equity investment plus provide X with a predetermined after-tax rate of return on its equity investment.
At the inception of the transaction, X requires FP to invest $9x of the $105x payment in highly rated debt securities (“Equity Collateral”), and to pledge the Equity Collateral to X to satisfy a portion of FP’s obligations under the lease.[3] Although the Equity Collateral is pledged to X, it is not among the items of collateral pledged to BK1 or BK2 in support of the nonrecourse loans to X. The Equity Collateral upon maturity, when combined with the balance of the deposits made with BK3 and BK4 and the interest on those deposits, fully funds the amount due if FP exercises the Purchase Option. This arrangement ensures that FP is able to make the payment under the Purchase Option without an independent source of funds. Having economically defeased both its rental obligations under the Lease and its payment obligations under the Purchase Option, FP keeps the remaining $6x, subject to its obligation to pay the Termination Value (described below) upon the happening of certain events specified under the Lease.
If FP does not exercise the Purchase Option, X may elect to (1) take back the property, or (2) exercise the Service Contract Option and compel FP either to (a) identify a qualified Service Recipient, or (b) enter (or compel an affiliate of FP to enter) into the Service Contract as the Service Recipient for the Service Contract Term. If X exercises the Service Contract Option, the Service Recipient must pay X predetermined minimum capacity payments sufficient to provide X with a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment. The Service Recipient also must reimburse X for X’s operating and maintenance costs for providing the services.
As a practical matter, the Purchase Option and the Service Contract Option collar X’s exposure to changes in the value of the property. If the value of the property is at least equal to the Purchase Option Exercise Price, FP likely will exercise the Purchase Option. Likewise, FP likely will exercise the Purchase Option if FP concludes that the costs of the Service Contract Option exceed the costs of the Purchase Option. Moreover, FP may exercise the Purchase Option even if the fair market value of the property is less than the Purchase Option Exercise Price because the Purchase Option is fully funded, and the excess of the Exercise Price over the projected value may not fully reflect the costs to FP of modifying, interrupting, or relocating its operations. If the Purchase Option is exercised, X will recover its equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax rate of return. Conversely, if the Purchase Option is not exercised, X may compel FP to locate a Service Recipient to enter into the Service Contract in return for payments sufficient to provide X with a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment, regardless of the value of the property.
Throughout the Lease Term, X has several remedies in the event of a default by FP, including a right to (1) take possession of the property or (2) cause FP to pay X specified damages (“Termination Value”). Likewise, throughout the Service Contract Term, X has similar remedies in the event of a default by the Service Recipient. On the Closing Date, the amount of the Termination Value is slightly greater than the purchase price of the property. The Termination Value fluctuates over the Lease Term and Service Contract Term, but at all times is sufficient to repay X’s entire loan balances and X’s initial equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax rate of return. The BK3 deposit, the BK4 deposit and the Equity Collateral are available to satisfy the Termination Value during the Lease Term. If the sum of the deposits plus the Equity Collateral is less than the Termination Value, X may require FP to maintain a letter of credit. During the Service Contract Term, the Service Recipient will be required to provide defeasance or other credit support that would be available to satisfy the Termination Value. As a result, X in almost all events will recover its investment plus a pre-tax rate of return.
For tax purposes, X claims deductions for interest on the loans and for depreciation on the property. X does not include the optional Service Contract Term in the lease term for purposes of calculating the property’s recovery period under §§ 168(g)(3)(A) and 168(i)(3). X includes in gross income the rents received on the Lease. If the Purchase Option is exercised, X also includes the Exercise Price in calculating its gain or loss realized on disposition of the property.
The form of the sale from FP to X may be a head lease for a term in excess of the assumed remaining useful life of the property and an option for X to purchase the property for a nominal amount at the conclusion of the head lease term. In some variations of this transaction, the participation agreement provides that if X refinances the nonrecourse loans, FP has a right to participate in the savings attributable to the reduced financing costs by allowing FP to renegotiate certain terms of the transaction, including the Lease rents and the Purchase Option price.
Situation 2
The facts are the same as in Situation 1 except for the following.
The Lease does not provide a Service Contract Option. In lieu of the Purchase Option described in Situation 1, FP has an option (“Early Termination Option”) to purchase the property from X on the date (“ETO Exercise Date”) that is 30 months before the end of the Lease Term. Exercise of the Early Termination Option allows FP to terminate the Lease and repurchase the property for a fixed exercise price (“ETO Exercise Price”) that on the Closing Date, exceeds the projected fair market value of the property on the ETO Exercise Date. The Early Termination Option price is sufficient to repay X’s entire loan balances and X’s initial equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax rate of return on its equity investment. The balance of the Equity Collateral combined with the balance of the deposits made with BK3 and BK4 and the interest on those deposits fully fund the amount due under the Early Termination Option.
If FP does not exercise the Early Termination Option, FP is required to obtain residual value insurance for the benefit of X, pay rents for the remaining Lease Term, and return the property to X at the end of the Lease Term (“Return Option”). The residual value insurance must be issued by a third party having a specified minimum credit rating and must provide that if the actual residual value of the property is less than a fixed amount (“Residual Value Insurance Amount”) at the end of the Lease Term, the insurer will pay X the shortfall. On the Closing Date, the Residual Value Insurance Amount is less than the projected fair market value of the property at the end of the Lease Term. If FP does not maintain the residual value insurance coverage for the entire Lease Term remaining after the ETO Exercise Date, FP will default and be obligated to pay X the Termination Value. If FP does not exercise the Early Termination Option, the rents for the remaining Lease Term plus the Residual Value Insurance Amount are sufficient to provide X with a minimum after-tax rate of return on the property, regardless of the value of the property. As a practical matter, the Early Termination Option and the Return Option collar X’s exposure to changes in the value of the property. At the end of the Lease Term, FP also may have the option to purchase the property for the greater of its fair market value or the Residual Value Insurance Amount.
For tax purposes, X claims deductions for interest on the loans and for depreciation on the property. X treats a portion of the property as qualified technological equipment within the meaning of § 168(i)(2). X depreciates that portion of the property over five years under § 168(g)(3)(C). X treats a portion of the property as software. X depreciates that portion of the property over 36 months under § 167(f)(1)(A).
X includes in gross income the rents received on the Lease. If the Early Termination Option is exercised, X also includes the ETO Exercise Price in calculating its gain or loss realized on disposition of the property.
In some variations of this transaction, if the Early Termination Option is not exercised, the Lease rents payable to X may increase for the portion of the Lease Term remaining after the ETO Exercise Date.
ANALYSIS
The substance of a transaction, not its form, governs its tax treatment. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that “[i]n applying the doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed.” The Court evaluated the substance of the particular transaction in Frank Lyon to determine that it should be treated as a sale-leaseback rather than a financing arrangement. The Supreme Court described the transaction in Frank Lyon as “a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached.” Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 584. The Court subsequently relied on its approach in Frank Lyon to recharacterize a sale and repurchase of federal securities as a loan, finding that the economic realities of the transaction did not support the form chosen by the taxpayer. Nebraska Dep’t of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994).
A sale-leaseback will not be respected unless the owner/lessor acquires and retains “significant and genuine attributes” of a traditional owner, including “the benefits and burdens of ownership.” Coleman v. Commissioner, 16 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 582-84). Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances in the transactions described in Situations 1 and 2, X does not acquire the benefits and burdens of ownership and consequently cannot claim tax benefits as the owner of the property. The transactions described above are, in substance, fundamentally different from the sale-leaseback transaction respected by the Court in Frank Lyon.
First, in Frank Lyon, the sales proceeds were used to construct the lessee’s new headquarters. In contrast, in the transactions described above, substantially all of the $105x sales proceeds are immediately set aside by FP to satisfy its obligations under the Lease and to fund FP’s exercise of the Purchase Option or the Early Termination Option. As a condition to engaging in the transactions, FP economically defeases substantially all of its rent payment obligations and the amounts due under the Purchase Option or the Early Termination Option by establishing and pledging the deposit with BK3 and the Equity Collateral. Moreover, even though FP may not pledge the deposit with BK4, FP fully funds its remaining rent obligations with the BK4 deposit and may have limited rights to access the funds held in that deposit. Consequently, the only capital retained by FP is the remaining $6x portion of the sales proceeds that represents FP’s fee for engaging in the transaction.
Second, in Frank Lyon, the taxpayer bore the risk of the lessee’s nonpayment of rent, which could have forced the taxpayer to default on its recourse debt. The Court concluded that the taxpayer exposed its business well-being to a real and substantial risk of nonpayment and that the long-term debt affected its financial position. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 577. In contrast, in the transactions described above, economic defeasance renders the risk to X of FP’s failure to pay rent remote. Moreover, because of the economic defeasance, X’s right to receive the Equity Collateral upon the exercise of the Purchase Option, and FP’s obligation with respect to the Termination Value, a failure by FP to satisfy its lease obligations does not leave X at risk for repaying the loan balances or forfeiting its equity investment.
Third, in Frank Lyon, the taxpayer’s return was dependent on the property’s value and the taxpayer’s equity investment was at risk if the property declined in value. The economic burden of any decline in the value of the property is integral to the determination of tax ownership. See, e.g., Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982). In the transactions described above, X bears insufficient risk of a decline in the value of the property to be treated as its owner for tax purposes. In Situation 1, regardless of a decline in the value of the property, X can recover its entire investment, repay both loans, and obtain a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment by exercising the Service Contract Option. Similarly, in Situation 2, a decline in the value of the property will not prevent X from recovering its entire investment, repaying both loans and obtaining a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment through the rents for the remaining Lease Term plus the Residual Value Insurance Amount under the Return Option. The failure of FP to satisfy its obligations under the Service Contract Option in Situation 1 or the Return Option in Situation 2 results in default and obligates FP to pay X the Termination Value. In both Situation 1 and Situation 2, the BK3 and BK4 deposits and Equity Collateral are available to fund FP’s obligations upon termination of the Lease. Thus, in both situations, X has substantially limited its risk of loss regardless of the value of the property upon termination of the Lease.
Fourth, the combination of FP’s Purchase Option and X’s Service Contract Option in Situation 1, and FP’s Early Termination Option and continued rent and residual value insurance obligations under the Return Option in Situation 2, significantly increase the likelihood that FP will exercise its Purchase Option in Situation 1 and its Early Termination Option in Situation 2 even if the fair market value of the property is less than the Purchase Option Exercise Price or ETO Exercise Price, respectively, because both options are fully funded and the excess of the exercise price over the leased property’s fair market value may not fully reflect the costs to FP of modifying, interrupting, or relocating its operations. See Kwiat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-433 (ostensible lessor did not possess the benefits and burdens of ownership because reciprocal put and call options limited the risk of economic depreciation and the benefit of possible appreciation); see also Aderholt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-491; Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87. In contrast, in Frank Lyon, the lessee’s decision regarding the exercise of its purchase option was not constrained by a lessor’s right to exercise a reciprocal option similar to the Service Contract Option or the Return Option described in Situations 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, X’s opportunity to recognize a return through refinancing the BK1 and BK2 loans is also limited in those cases in which FP has a right to participate in any savings attributable to reduced financing costs, such as through renegotiation of the Lease rents and the Purchase Option price. See Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff’d, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982) (arrangement whereby lessor and lessee shared the savings from any refinancing of lessor’s nonrecourse debt was a factor supporting holding to disregard form of sale-leaseback transaction).
In the transactions described above, X does not have a meaningful interest in the risks and rewards of the property. Thus, X does not acquire the benefits and burdens of ownership of the property and does not become the owner of the property for U.S. federal income tax purposes. In substance, the transactions described above are merely a transfer of tax benefits to X, coupled with X’s investment of the Equity Collateral for a predetermined after-tax rate of return.
Furthermore, in appropriate cases, the Service may challenge the purported tax benefits from these transactions on additional grounds, including (1) that the substance over form doctrine requires recharacterization of the arrangement as a financing arrangement, or (2) that the loans from BK1 and BK2, in substance, do not involve the use or forbearance of money, do not constitute valid indebtedness for tax purposes, and that any interest nominally paid or accrued on the loans is not deductible. Cf. Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760 (disregarded offsetting obligations in a LILO arrangement gave the taxpayer, at most, a future interest in the property).
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (the “Act”), was enacted on October 22, 2004. Section 847 of the Act amended §§ 167 and 168 to provide that service contracts that follow a lease must be included in the lease term and to modify the recovery period for qualified technological equipment and computer software subject to a lease with a tax-exempt entity. Section 848 of the Act added new § 470, which suspends losses for certain leases of property to tax-exempt entities. See H.R. Rep. No. 755, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., at 660, 662-663 (2004). These amendments generally are effective for leases entered into after March 12, 2004.[4]
Transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transactions described in this notice are identified as “listed transactions” for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) and §§ 6111 and 6112 effective February 11, 2005, the date this notice is released to the public. Independent of their classification as “listed transactions,” transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transactions described in this notice may already be subject to the requirements of § 6011, § 6111, or § 6112, or the regulations thereunder. Persons required to disclose these transactions under § 1.6011-4 who fail to do so may be subject to the penalty under § 6707A.[5] Persons required to disclose or register these transactions under § 6111 who have failed to do so may be subject to the penalty under § 6707(a). Persons required to maintain lists of investors under § 6112 who have failed to do so (or who fail to provide such lists when requested by the Service) may be subject to the penalty under § 6708(a). In addition, the Service may impose penalties on parties involved in these transactions or substantially similar transactions, including accuracy-related penalties under § 6662 or § 6662A.
The Service and the Treasury Department recognize that some taxpayers may have filed tax returns taking the position that they were entitled to the purported tax benefits of the types of transactions described in this notice. These taxpayers should consult with a tax advisor to ensure that their transactions are disclosed properly and to take appropriate corrective action.
DRAFTING INFORMATION
For further information regarding this notice, contact John Aramburu at (202) 622-4960 (not a toll-free call).
[1] In some instances, FP meets the definition of a tax-exempt entity under section 168(h)(2). In other instances, FP does not meet that definition but possesses attributes, such as net operating losses, that render FP tax indifferent.
[2] The arrangement by which FP sets aside the funds necessary to meet its obligations under the Lease may take a variety of forms other than a deposit arrangement involving BK3 and BK4. These arrangements include a loan by FP to X, BK1 or BK2; a letter of credit collateralized with cash or cash equivalents; a payment undertaking agreement; prepaid rent (regardless of whether X finances a portion of the purchase price by borrowing from BK1 or BK2); a sinking fund arrangement; a guaranteed investment contract; or financial guaranty insurance.
[3] The arrangement by which the return of X’s equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax return on such investment is provided may take a variety of forms other than an investment by FP in highly rated debt securities. For example, FP may be required to obtain a payment undertaking agreement from an entity having a specified minimum credit rating.
[4] Leases or purported leases of Qualified Transportation Property described in section 849(b) of the Act are not identified as listed transactions subject to the terms of this notice.
[5] Section 6707A applies to returns and statements due after October 22, 2004. See Notice 2005-11, 2005-7 I.R.B. 493.
February 28, 2005
Notice 2005-13
Tax-Exempt Leasing Involving Defeasance
The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department are aware of types of transactions, described below, in which a taxpayer enters into a purported sale-leaseback arrangement with a tax-indifferent person in which substantially all of the tax-indifferent person’s payment obligations are economically defeased and the taxpayer’s risk of loss from a decline, and opportunity for profit from an increase, in the value of the leased property are limited. This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that these transactions are tax avoidance transactions and identifies these transactions, and substantially similar transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) of the Income Tax Regulations and §§ 6111 and 6112 of the Internal Revenue Code. This notice also alerts parties involved with these transactions of certain responsibilities that may arise from their involvement with these transactions.
FACTS
X is a U.S. taxpayer. FP is a tax-indifferent person that owns and uses certain property.[1] BK1, BK2, BK3, and BK4 are banks. None of these parties is related to any other party, unless otherwise indicated.
Situation 1
On the closing date of January 1, 2003 (“Closing Date”), X and FP enter into a purported sale-leaseback transaction under which FP sells the property to X, and X immediately leases the property back to FP under a lease (“Lease”). The purchase and sale agreement and the Lease are nominally separate legal documents. Both agreements, however, are executed pursuant to a comprehensive participation agreement, which provides that the parties’ rights and obligations under any of the agreements are not enforceable before the execution of all transaction documents.
The Lease requires FP to make rental payments over the term of the Lease (“Lease Term”). As described below, the Lease also provides that under certain conditions, X has the option (“Service Contract Option”) to require FP to identify a party (“Service Recipient”) willing to enter into a contract with X to receive services provided using the leased property (“Service Contract”) that commences immediately after the expiration of the Lease Term. The Service Recipient must meet certain financial qualifications, including credit rating and net capital requirements, and provide defeasance or other credit support to satisfy certain of its obligations under the Service Contract. If FP cannot locate a qualified third party to enter into the Service Contract, FP or an affiliate of FP must enter into the Service Contract. The aggregate of the Lease Term plus the term of the Service Contract (“Service Contract Term”) is less than 80 percent of the assumed remaining useful life of the property.
On the Closing Date, the property has a fair market value of $105x and X makes a single payment of $105x to FP. To fund the $105x payment, X provides $15x in equity and borrows $81x from BK1 and $9x from BK2. Both loans are nonrecourse and provide for payments during the Lease Term. Accrued but unpaid interest is capitalized as additional principal. As of the Closing Date, the documents reflect that the sum of the outstanding principal on the loans at any given time will be less than the projected fair market value of the property at that time. The amount and timing of the debt service payments closely match the amount and timing of the Lease payments due during the Lease Term.
FP intends to utilize only a small portion of the proceeds of the purported sale-leaseback for operational expenses or to finance or refinance the acquisition of new assets. Upon receiving the $105x purchase price payment, FP sets aside substantially all of the $105x to satisfy its lease obligations. FP deposits $81x with BK3 and $9x with BK4. BK3 may be an affiliate of BK1, and BK4 may be an affiliate of BK2. The deposits with BK3 and BK4 earn interest sufficient to fund FP’s rent obligations as described below. BK3 pays annual amounts equal to 90 percent of FP’s annual rent obligation under the Lease (that is, amounts sufficient to satisfy X’s debt service obligation to BK1). Although FP directs BK3 to pay those amounts to BK1, the parties treat these amounts as having been paid from BK3 to FP, then from FP to X as rental payments, and finally from X to BK1 as debt service payments. In addition, FP pledges the deposit with BK3 to X as security for FP’s obligations under the Lease, while X, in turn, pledges its interest in FP’s pledge to BK1 as security for X’s obligations under the loan from BK1. Similarly, BK4 pays annual amounts equal to 10 percent of FP’s rent obligation under the Lease (that is, amounts sufficient to satisfy X’s debt service obligation to BK2). Although FP directs BK4 to pay these amounts to BK2, the parties treat these amounts as having been paid from BK4 to FP, then from FP to X as rental payments, and finally from X to BK2 as debt service payments. Although FP’s deposit with BK4 is not pledged, the parties expect that the amounts deposited with BK4 will remain available to pay the remaining 10 percent of FP’s annual rent obligation under the Lease. FP may incur economic costs, such as an early withdrawal penalty, in accessing the BK4 deposit.
FP is not legally released from its rent obligations. X’s exposure to the risk that FP will not make the rent payments, however, is substantially limited by the arrangements with BK3 and BK4. In the case of the loan from BK1, X’s economic risk is remote due to the deposit arrangement with BK3. In the case of the loan from BK2, X’s economic risk is substantially reduced through the deposit arrangement with BK4. X’s obligation to make debt service payments on the loans from BK1 and BK2 is completely offset by X’s right to receive Lease rentals from FP. As a result, neither bank bears a significant risk of nonpayment.[2]
FP has an option (“Purchase Option”) to purchase the property from X on the last day of the Lease Term (“Exercise Date”). Exercise of the Purchase Option allows FP to repurchase the property for a fixed exercise price (“Exercise Price”) that, on the Closing Date, exceeds the projected fair market value of the property on the Exercise Date. The Purchase Option price is sufficient to repay X’s entire loan balances and X’s initial equity investment plus provide X with a predetermined after-tax rate of return on its equity investment.
At the inception of the transaction, X requires FP to invest $9x of the $105x payment in highly rated debt securities (“Equity Collateral”), and to pledge the Equity Collateral to X to satisfy a portion of FP’s obligations under the lease.[3] Although the Equity Collateral is pledged to X, it is not among the items of collateral pledged to BK1 or BK2 in support of the nonrecourse loans to X. The Equity Collateral upon maturity, when combined with the balance of the deposits made with BK3 and BK4 and the interest on those deposits, fully funds the amount due if FP exercises the Purchase Option. This arrangement ensures that FP is able to make the payment under the Purchase Option without an independent source of funds. Having economically defeased both its rental obligations under the Lease and its payment obligations under the Purchase Option, FP keeps the remaining $6x, subject to its obligation to pay the Termination Value (described below) upon the happening of certain events specified under the Lease.
If FP does not exercise the Purchase Option, X may elect to (1) take back the property, or (2) exercise the Service Contract Option and compel FP either to (a) identify a qualified Service Recipient, or (b) enter (or compel an affiliate of FP to enter) into the Service Contract as the Service Recipient for the Service Contract Term. If X exercises the Service Contract Option, the Service Recipient must pay X predetermined minimum capacity payments sufficient to provide X with a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment. The Service Recipient also must reimburse X for X’s operating and maintenance costs for providing the services.
As a practical matter, the Purchase Option and the Service Contract Option collar X’s exposure to changes in the value of the property. If the value of the property is at least equal to the Purchase Option Exercise Price, FP likely will exercise the Purchase Option. Likewise, FP likely will exercise the Purchase Option if FP concludes that the costs of the Service Contract Option exceed the costs of the Purchase Option. Moreover, FP may exercise the Purchase Option even if the fair market value of the property is less than the Purchase Option Exercise Price because the Purchase Option is fully funded, and the excess of the Exercise Price over the projected value may not fully reflect the costs to FP of modifying, interrupting, or relocating its operations. If the Purchase Option is exercised, X will recover its equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax rate of return. Conversely, if the Purchase Option is not exercised, X may compel FP to locate a Service Recipient to enter into the Service Contract in return for payments sufficient to provide X with a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment, regardless of the value of the property.
Throughout the Lease Term, X has several remedies in the event of a default by FP, including a right to (1) take possession of the property or (2) cause FP to pay X specified damages (“Termination Value”). Likewise, throughout the Service Contract Term, X has similar remedies in the event of a default by the Service Recipient. On the Closing Date, the amount of the Termination Value is slightly greater than the purchase price of the property. The Termination Value fluctuates over the Lease Term and Service Contract Term, but at all times is sufficient to repay X’s entire loan balances and X’s initial equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax rate of return. The BK3 deposit, the BK4 deposit and the Equity Collateral are available to satisfy the Termination Value during the Lease Term. If the sum of the deposits plus the Equity Collateral is less than the Termination Value, X may require FP to maintain a letter of credit. During the Service Contract Term, the Service Recipient will be required to provide defeasance or other credit support that would be available to satisfy the Termination Value. As a result, X in almost all events will recover its investment plus a pre-tax rate of return.
For tax purposes, X claims deductions for interest on the loans and for depreciation on the property. X does not include the optional Service Contract Term in the lease term for purposes of calculating the property’s recovery period under §§ 168(g)(3)(A) and 168(i)(3). X includes in gross income the rents received on the Lease. If the Purchase Option is exercised, X also includes the Exercise Price in calculating its gain or loss realized on disposition of the property.
The form of the sale from FP to X may be a head lease for a term in excess of the assumed remaining useful life of the property and an option for X to purchase the property for a nominal amount at the conclusion of the head lease term. In some variations of this transaction, the participation agreement provides that if X refinances the nonrecourse loans, FP has a right to participate in the savings attributable to the reduced financing costs by allowing FP to renegotiate certain terms of the transaction, including the Lease rents and the Purchase Option price.
Situation 2
The facts are the same as in Situation 1 except for the following.
The Lease does not provide a Service Contract Option. In lieu of the Purchase Option described in Situation 1, FP has an option (“Early Termination Option”) to purchase the property from X on the date (“ETO Exercise Date”) that is 30 months before the end of the Lease Term. Exercise of the Early Termination Option allows FP to terminate the Lease and repurchase the property for a fixed exercise price (“ETO Exercise Price”) that on the Closing Date, exceeds the projected fair market value of the property on the ETO Exercise Date. The Early Termination Option price is sufficient to repay X’s entire loan balances and X’s initial equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax rate of return on its equity investment. The balance of the Equity Collateral combined with the balance of the deposits made with BK3 and BK4 and the interest on those deposits fully fund the amount due under the Early Termination Option.
If FP does not exercise the Early Termination Option, FP is required to obtain residual value insurance for the benefit of X, pay rents for the remaining Lease Term, and return the property to X at the end of the Lease Term (“Return Option”). The residual value insurance must be issued by a third party having a specified minimum credit rating and must provide that if the actual residual value of the property is less than a fixed amount (“Residual Value Insurance Amount”) at the end of the Lease Term, the insurer will pay X the shortfall. On the Closing Date, the Residual Value Insurance Amount is less than the projected fair market value of the property at the end of the Lease Term. If FP does not maintain the residual value insurance coverage for the entire Lease Term remaining after the ETO Exercise Date, FP will default and be obligated to pay X the Termination Value. If FP does not exercise the Early Termination Option, the rents for the remaining Lease Term plus the Residual Value Insurance Amount are sufficient to provide X with a minimum after-tax rate of return on the property, regardless of the value of the property. As a practical matter, the Early Termination Option and the Return Option collar X’s exposure to changes in the value of the property. At the end of the Lease Term, FP also may have the option to purchase the property for the greater of its fair market value or the Residual Value Insurance Amount.
For tax purposes, X claims deductions for interest on the loans and for depreciation on the property. X treats a portion of the property as qualified technological equipment within the meaning of § 168(i)(2). X depreciates that portion of the property over five years under § 168(g)(3)(C). X treats a portion of the property as software. X depreciates that portion of the property over 36 months under § 167(f)(1)(A).
X includes in gross income the rents received on the Lease. If the Early Termination Option is exercised, X also includes the ETO Exercise Price in calculating its gain or loss realized on disposition of the property.
In some variations of this transaction, if the Early Termination Option is not exercised, the Lease rents payable to X may increase for the portion of the Lease Term remaining after the ETO Exercise Date.
ANALYSIS
The substance of a transaction, not its form, governs its tax treatment. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that “[i]n applying the doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed.” The Court evaluated the substance of the particular transaction in Frank Lyon to determine that it should be treated as a sale-leaseback rather than a financing arrangement. The Supreme Court described the transaction in Frank Lyon as “a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached.” Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 584. The Court subsequently relied on its approach in Frank Lyon to recharacterize a sale and repurchase of federal securities as a loan, finding that the economic realities of the transaction did not support the form chosen by the taxpayer. Nebraska Dep’t of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994).
A sale-leaseback will not be respected unless the owner/lessor acquires and retains “significant and genuine attributes” of a traditional owner, including “the benefits and burdens of ownership.” Coleman v. Commissioner, 16 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 582-84). Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances in the transactions described in Situations 1 and 2, X does not acquire the benefits and burdens of ownership and consequently cannot claim tax benefits as the owner of the property. The transactions described above are, in substance, fundamentally different from the sale-leaseback transaction respected by the Court in Frank Lyon.
First, in Frank Lyon, the sales proceeds were used to construct the lessee’s new headquarters. In contrast, in the transactions described above, substantially all of the $105x sales proceeds are immediately set aside by FP to satisfy its obligations under the Lease and to fund FP’s exercise of the Purchase Option or the Early Termination Option. As a condition to engaging in the transactions, FP economically defeases substantially all of its rent payment obligations and the amounts due under the Purchase Option or the Early Termination Option by establishing and pledging the deposit with BK3 and the Equity Collateral. Moreover, even though FP may not pledge the deposit with BK4, FP fully funds its remaining rent obligations with the BK4 deposit and may have limited rights to access the funds held in that deposit. Consequently, the only capital retained by FP is the remaining $6x portion of the sales proceeds that represents FP’s fee for engaging in the transaction.
Second, in Frank Lyon, the taxpayer bore the risk of the lessee’s nonpayment of rent, which could have forced the taxpayer to default on its recourse debt. The Court concluded that the taxpayer exposed its business well-being to a real and substantial risk of nonpayment and that the long-term debt affected its financial position. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 577. In contrast, in the transactions described above, economic defeasance renders the risk to X of FP’s failure to pay rent remote. Moreover, because of the economic defeasance, X’s right to receive the Equity Collateral upon the exercise of the Purchase Option, and FP’s obligation with respect to the Termination Value, a failure by FP to satisfy its lease obligations does not leave X at risk for repaying the loan balances or forfeiting its equity investment.
Third, in Frank Lyon, the taxpayer’s return was dependent on the property’s value and the taxpayer’s equity investment was at risk if the property declined in value. The economic burden of any decline in the value of the property is integral to the determination of tax ownership. See, e.g., Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982). In the transactions described above, X bears insufficient risk of a decline in the value of the property to be treated as its owner for tax purposes. In Situation 1, regardless of a decline in the value of the property, X can recover its entire investment, repay both loans, and obtain a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment by exercising the Service Contract Option. Similarly, in Situation 2, a decline in the value of the property will not prevent X from recovering its entire investment, repaying both loans and obtaining a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment through the rents for the remaining Lease Term plus the Residual Value Insurance Amount under the Return Option. The failure of FP to satisfy its obligations under the Service Contract Option in Situation 1 or the Return Option in Situation 2 results in default and obligates FP to pay X the Termination Value. In both Situation 1 and Situation 2, the BK3 and BK4 deposits and Equity Collateral are available to fund FP’s obligations upon termination of the Lease. Thus, in both situations, X has substantially limited its risk of loss regardless of the value of the property upon termination of the Lease.
Fourth, the combination of FP’s Purchase Option and X’s Service Contract Option in Situation 1, and FP’s Early Termination Option and continued rent and residual value insurance obligations under the Return Option in Situation 2, significantly increase the likelihood that FP will exercise its Purchase Option in Situation 1 and its Early Termination Option in Situation 2 even if the fair market value of the property is less than the Purchase Option Exercise Price or ETO Exercise Price, respectively, because both options are fully funded and the excess of the exercise price over the leased property’s fair market value may not fully reflect the costs to FP of modifying, interrupting, or relocating its operations. See Kwiat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-433 (ostensible lessor did not possess the benefits and burdens of ownership because reciprocal put and call options limited the risk of economic depreciation and the benefit of possible appreciation); see also Aderholt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-491; Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87. In contrast, in Frank Lyon, the lessee’s decision regarding the exercise of its purchase option was not constrained by a lessor’s right to exercise a reciprocal option similar to the Service Contract Option or the Return Option described in Situations 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, X’s opportunity to recognize a return through refinancing the BK1 and BK2 loans is also limited in those cases in which FP has a right to participate in any savings attributable to reduced financing costs, such as through renegotiation of the Lease rents and the Purchase Option price. See Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff’d, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982) (arrangement whereby lessor and lessee shared the savings from any refinancing of lessor’s nonrecourse debt was a factor supporting holding to disregard form of sale-leaseback transaction).
In the transactions described above, X does not have a meaningful interest in the risks and rewards of the property. Thus, X does not acquire the benefits and burdens of ownership of the property and does not become the owner of the property for U.S. federal income tax purposes. In substance, the transactions described above are merely a transfer of tax benefits to X, coupled with X’s investment of the Equity Collateral for a predetermined after-tax rate of return.
Furthermore, in appropriate cases, the Service may challenge the purported tax benefits from these transactions on additional grounds, including (1) that the substance over form doctrine requires recharacterization of the arrangement as a financing arrangement, or (2) that the loans from BK1 and BK2, in substance, do not involve the use or forbearance of money, do not constitute valid indebtedness for tax purposes, and that any interest nominally paid or accrued on the loans is not deductible. Cf. Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760 (disregarded offsetting obligations in a LILO arrangement gave the taxpayer, at most, a future interest in the property).
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (the “Act”), was enacted on October 22, 2004. Section 847 of the Act amended §§ 167 and 168 to provide that service contracts that follow a lease must be included in the lease term and to modify the recovery period for qualified technological equipment and computer software subject to a lease with a tax-exempt entity. Section 848 of the Act added new § 470, which suspends losses for certain leases of property to tax-exempt entities. See H.R. Rep. No. 755, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., at 660, 662-663 (2004). These amendments generally are effective for leases entered into after March 12, 2004.[4]
Transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transactions described in this notice are identified as “listed transactions” for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) and §§ 6111 and 6112 effective February 11, 2005, the date this notice is released to the public. Independent of their classification as “listed transactions,” transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transactions described in this notice may already be subject to the requirements of § 6011, § 6111, or § 6112, or the regulations thereunder. Persons required to disclose these transactions under § 1.6011-4 who fail to do so may be subject to the penalty under § 6707A.[5] Persons required to disclose or register these transactions under § 6111 who have failed to do so may be subject to the penalty under § 6707(a). Persons required to maintain lists of investors under § 6112 who have failed to do so (or who fail to provide such lists when requested by the Service) may be subject to the penalty under § 6708(a). In addition, the Service may impose penalties on parties involved in these transactions or substantially similar transactions, including accuracy-related penalties under § 6662 or § 6662A.
The Service and the Treasury Department recognize that some taxpayers may have filed tax returns taking the position that they were entitled to the purported tax benefits of the types of transactions described in this notice. These taxpayers should consult with a tax advisor to ensure that their transactions are disclosed properly and to take appropriate corrective action.
DRAFTING INFORMATION
For further information regarding this notice, contact John Aramburu at (202) 622-4960 (not a toll-free call).
[1] In some instances, FP meets the definition of a tax-exempt entity under section 168(h)(2). In other instances, FP does not meet that definition but possesses attributes, such as net operating losses, that render FP tax indifferent.
[2] The arrangement by which FP sets aside the funds necessary to meet its obligations under the Lease may take a variety of forms other than a deposit arrangement involving BK3 and BK4. These arrangements include a loan by FP to X, BK1 or BK2; a letter of credit collateralized with cash or cash equivalents; a payment undertaking agreement; prepaid rent (regardless of whether X finances a portion of the purchase price by borrowing from BK1 or BK2); a sinking fund arrangement; a guaranteed investment contract; or financial guaranty insurance.
[3] The arrangement by which the return of X’s equity investment plus a predetermined after-tax return on such investment is provided may take a variety of forms other than an investment by FP in highly rated debt securities. For example, FP may be required to obtain a payment undertaking agreement from an entity having a specified minimum credit rating.
[4] Leases or purported leases of Qualified Transportation Property described in section 849(b) of the Act are not identified as listed transactions subject to the terms of this notice.
[5] Section 6707A applies to returns and statements due after October 22, 2004. See Notice 2005-11, 2005-7 I.R.B. 493.
Donnerstag, Februar 17, 2005
Deutscher Städtetag: US-Cross-Border-Leasing; Mitteilung des IRS vom 11. Februar 2005
In unseren Mitteilungen vom 16. November 2004 hatten wir darauf verwiesen, daß im Oktober 2004 der Senat und das Repräsentantenhaus des US-Kongresses die sogenannte PSC/ETI Tax Bill (H.R.4520) verabschiedet haben. Darin enthalten sind auch Regelungen zur steuerlichen Behandlung von bestimmten Arten von Cross-Border-Leasing-Verträgen (§§ 847 bis 849). Vor dem Hintergrund aktueller Berichte der deutschen Presse (so z.B. Handelsblatt vom 15.02.2005), die nach unserer Einschätzung eher zu einer Verunsicherung der Öffentlichkeit als zur Klärung aktueller Entwicklungen beitragen, übersenden wir Ihnen mit der Anlage eine Mitteilung der US-amerikanischen Bundessteuerbehörde (IRS) vom 11. Februar 2005 und eine kurze Pressemitteilung des US-Finanzministeriums zu Kenntnis. Die Notiz nimmt Stellung zu möglichen steuerlichen Behandlungen, sog. SILO-Transaktionen (Sale in, lease out). Sprachlich ist dies angelehnt an die bis Mai 1999 praktizierten LILO-Transaktionen (Lease in, lease out) und erfaßt damit die seit Mai 1999 in Deutschland abgeschlossenen sog. Service-Contract-Transaktionen.
Nach übereinstimmender Einschätzung von Beratern (Allen & Overy LLP) und dem Innenministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen ist zu diesen Papieren festzustellen:
1. Als Notiz handelt es sich bei dieser Mitteilung lediglich um die Auffassung der US-Steuerverwaltung. Es liegt somit keine Gesetzesänderung oder Verordnung vor.
2. Der IRS teilt mit, daß man SILO-Transaktionen sehr kritisch im Rahmen steuerlichen Betriebsprüfung prüfen wird. Dies wurde und wird für die verwandten LILO-Transaktionen bereits seit Jahren praktiziert und hatte bisher auf die deutsche Leasingnehmerseite im Sinne von Geltendmachung von Vertragsverletzungen mit der Folge von Schadensersatzforderungen keine Konsequenzen.
3. In den USA steuerpflichtige Personen müssen ihre Teilnahme an SILO-Transaktionen den US-Steuerbehörden schriftlich mitteilen. Dies gilt seit dem 11. Februar 2005 und resultiert aus der Einstufung der SILO-Transaktionen als sog. "Listed Transactions" im Sinne der §§ 6111, 6112 des IRC (US-Bundessteuergesetz).
Sofern in Ihrem Zuständigkeitsbereich in der Vergangenheit von derartigen Transaktionsmöglichkeiten Gebrauch gemacht wurde, sollte überprüft werden, ob eine (evtl. auch beschränkte) Steuerpflicht in den Vereinigten Staaten als deutscher Leasingnehmer besteht. Denn dann wäre wie oben aufgeführt, die Teilnahme an SILO-Transaktionen den US-Steuerbehörden mitzuteilen. Nach den uns vorliegenden Einschätzungen von Beratern sind die deutschen Leasingnehmer in der Regel in den USA nicht steuerpflichtig, so daß die Mitteilungspflicht ohne Bedeutung sein dürfte.
Generell gilt, daß bei diesen Geschäften auch in Zukunft die Risikosteuerung und Vertragsüberwachung nicht vernachlässigt werden sollte.
(AZ 20.14.12D - C 2408 vom 17. Februar 2005)
Nach übereinstimmender Einschätzung von Beratern (Allen & Overy LLP) und dem Innenministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen ist zu diesen Papieren festzustellen:
1. Als Notiz handelt es sich bei dieser Mitteilung lediglich um die Auffassung der US-Steuerverwaltung. Es liegt somit keine Gesetzesänderung oder Verordnung vor.
2. Der IRS teilt mit, daß man SILO-Transaktionen sehr kritisch im Rahmen steuerlichen Betriebsprüfung prüfen wird. Dies wurde und wird für die verwandten LILO-Transaktionen bereits seit Jahren praktiziert und hatte bisher auf die deutsche Leasingnehmerseite im Sinne von Geltendmachung von Vertragsverletzungen mit der Folge von Schadensersatzforderungen keine Konsequenzen.
3. In den USA steuerpflichtige Personen müssen ihre Teilnahme an SILO-Transaktionen den US-Steuerbehörden schriftlich mitteilen. Dies gilt seit dem 11. Februar 2005 und resultiert aus der Einstufung der SILO-Transaktionen als sog. "Listed Transactions" im Sinne der §§ 6111, 6112 des IRC (US-Bundessteuergesetz).
Sofern in Ihrem Zuständigkeitsbereich in der Vergangenheit von derartigen Transaktionsmöglichkeiten Gebrauch gemacht wurde, sollte überprüft werden, ob eine (evtl. auch beschränkte) Steuerpflicht in den Vereinigten Staaten als deutscher Leasingnehmer besteht. Denn dann wäre wie oben aufgeführt, die Teilnahme an SILO-Transaktionen den US-Steuerbehörden mitzuteilen. Nach den uns vorliegenden Einschätzungen von Beratern sind die deutschen Leasingnehmer in der Regel in den USA nicht steuerpflichtig, so daß die Mitteilungspflicht ohne Bedeutung sein dürfte.
Generell gilt, daß bei diesen Geschäften auch in Zukunft die Risikosteuerung und Vertragsüberwachung nicht vernachlässigt werden sollte.
(AZ 20.14.12D - C 2408 vom 17. Februar 2005)
Samstag, Februar 12, 2005
Leseübersetzung der Presseveröffentlichung vom 11. Februar 2005
Von der Abteilung für öffentliche Angelegenheiten
11. Februar 2005
Finanzministerium erläßt Richtlinie für mißbräuchliche "SILO" Gestaltungen
Das Finanzministerium und die Bundessteuerbehörde ("IRS") haben heute eine Richtlinie herausgegeben, die "sale-in/lease-out" oder "SILO" Gestaltungen als mißbräuchliche Steuerumgehungstransaktionen festlegen.
SILO Gestaltungen sehen vor, das Steuerrecht auszunutzen, indem steuerliche Vorteile von einer steuerneutralen Partei, die diese nicht nutzen kann, auf einen Steuerzahler verlagert werden, der diese nutzen kann. Steuerzahler, die einen SILO Vertrag schließen, können aufgrund eines Mietvertrages keinen Anspruch auf Steuervorteile wie ein Eigentümer eines Anlagegegenstandes geltend machen, weil sie kein Eigentum des Anlagegegenstandes im steuerlichen Sinne erwerben.
In dem amerikanischen Arbeitsplatzbeschaffungsgesetz ("American Jobs Creation Act") von 2004 hat der Kongreß Einschränkungen der Abzugsfähigkeit von Verlusten künftiger SILO Transaktionen verordnet. Die jetzige Bekanntmachung informiert Steuerzahler darüber, daß der IRS die behaupteten Steuervorteile, die von Steuerzahlern beansprucht werden, die frühere SILO Transaktionen abgeschlossen haben, aus einer Anzahl von Gründen angreifen wird. Ferner wurde erklärt, daß SILO's als eingetragene Transaktionen ("listed transactions") gelten. Steuerzahler, die SILO Transaktionen abgeschlossen haben und die verpflichtet sind Steuererklärungen einzureichen, müssen ihre Beteiligungen bei der IRS bekanntgeben. Zusätzlich müssen Arrangeure von eingetragenen Transaktionen Verzeichnisse von Investoren aufbewahren und in bestimmten Fällen solche Transaktionen an den IRS melden.
Eine Kopie dieser Bekanntmachung ist beigefügt.
11. Februar 2005
Finanzministerium erläßt Richtlinie für mißbräuchliche "SILO" Gestaltungen
Das Finanzministerium und die Bundessteuerbehörde ("IRS") haben heute eine Richtlinie herausgegeben, die "sale-in/lease-out" oder "SILO" Gestaltungen als mißbräuchliche Steuerumgehungstransaktionen festlegen.
SILO Gestaltungen sehen vor, das Steuerrecht auszunutzen, indem steuerliche Vorteile von einer steuerneutralen Partei, die diese nicht nutzen kann, auf einen Steuerzahler verlagert werden, der diese nutzen kann. Steuerzahler, die einen SILO Vertrag schließen, können aufgrund eines Mietvertrages keinen Anspruch auf Steuervorteile wie ein Eigentümer eines Anlagegegenstandes geltend machen, weil sie kein Eigentum des Anlagegegenstandes im steuerlichen Sinne erwerben.
In dem amerikanischen Arbeitsplatzbeschaffungsgesetz ("American Jobs Creation Act") von 2004 hat der Kongreß Einschränkungen der Abzugsfähigkeit von Verlusten künftiger SILO Transaktionen verordnet. Die jetzige Bekanntmachung informiert Steuerzahler darüber, daß der IRS die behaupteten Steuervorteile, die von Steuerzahlern beansprucht werden, die frühere SILO Transaktionen abgeschlossen haben, aus einer Anzahl von Gründen angreifen wird. Ferner wurde erklärt, daß SILO's als eingetragene Transaktionen ("listed transactions") gelten. Steuerzahler, die SILO Transaktionen abgeschlossen haben und die verpflichtet sind Steuererklärungen einzureichen, müssen ihre Beteiligungen bei der IRS bekanntgeben. Zusätzlich müssen Arrangeure von eingetragenen Transaktionen Verzeichnisse von Investoren aufbewahren und in bestimmten Fällen solche Transaktionen an den IRS melden.
Eine Kopie dieser Bekanntmachung ist beigefügt.
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